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Chapter 7 
The Carbon Economy and Emissions Reporting 
Janek Ratnatunga, Dina Wahyuni and Stewart Jones 
 
Introduction 
Substantial scientific evidence shows that global warming has become a threat that requires 
urgent action to mitigate global climate change1 (Garnaut, 2008; Stern, 2006). The first 
international treaty that attempted to reduce the impact of climate change was the Kyoto 
Protocol, signed on 11 December 1998 (United Nations, 1998). The Protocol applies the 
principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' which has evolved into 'different 
targets for different developed countries, and no targets at all for developing countries' in order 
to cut greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions back to their 1990 levels. The Protocol-ratifying 
countries are committed to attain agreed targets on emissions reduction during the first 
commitment period 2008-2012 (United Nations, 1998). 
 There is no mandatory prescription for the policy framework that might be used to 
achieve GHGs emission control targets under the Protocol. Once a country has ratified the 
Protocol, it may develop its own carbon policy, such as a carbon tax or a specific policy for 
heavy polluting industries. This has resulted in a wide variety of carbon-reducing policy 
instruments in different countries (Pinkse & Kolk, 2009), which means that different 
compliance requirements are involved, with the consequential increased regulatory compliance 
costs for business entities operating in more than one of these jurisdictions. 
 In this chapter, we seek to provide a comprehensive review of regulatory frameworks 
and settings with respect to GHGs in two developed countries, as compared to two developing 
countries. The outline of various climate policy instruments will shed light on the likely costs 
associated with carbon regularity compliance and the inevitable flow-on of higher prices for 
consumers in both developed and developing countries. 
 
International Climate Change Negotiations 
Global awareness on environmental concerns was first raised by the United Nations (UN) and 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the early 1970s. UN and WMO 
subsequently established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to 
scientifically assess environmental trends. The IPCC's first Assessment Report, which was 
published in 1990, noted that the earth had been warming more than usual due to the increased 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
1 Climate change is 'a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods' (United Nations, 1992, p. 3). 
 
                                                          
 This scientific evidence, along with updated data presented in the IPCC Supplementary 
Report 1992, prompted global initiatives to slow down global warming at the UN Conference, 
known as the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992. The UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, 'the Convention' hereafter) was adopted here, and it came into 
effect in 1994. The Convention has now been ratified by 192 countries (known as Parties to 
the Convention), including the US, which agreed to curb its GHGs emissions to their 1990 
level (Baumert, Herzog, & Pershing, 2005). Parties to the Convention have met annually since 
1995 to negotiate the implementation of the Convention in what is called the Conference of the 
Parties (COP). The COP term subsequently became known as the MOP (Meeting of the 
Parties), and since 2007 has been called CMP (Conference and Meeting of the Parties) (Dawson 
& Spannagle, 2009). 
 The second IPCC Assessment Report, published in 1996, emphasized that increased 
global warming had been caused by human activity. The highlighting of human-induced 
climate change encouraged the Parties to the Convention to take more serious actions than 
merely making voluntary commitments to reducing GHGs emissions. COP3, which took place 
in Kyoto in 1997, agreed to adopt the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol, hereafter) which requires 
legally binding emissions targets in ratifying countries. 
 The Protocol was to come into force once two conditions were fulfilled: (1) at least 55 
countries ratify the Protocol and (2) the emissions level of these 55 developed ratifying 
countries should collectively account for at least 55% of total developed countries' emissions 
levels in 1990. The first threshold was reached in 2003 and the second requirement was met 
with Russian ratification in 2004. The Protocol then entered into effect in 2005 with an average 
5.2% reduction target in emissions from developed countries - compared with their 1990 total 
emissions level – aimed for within the first Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012 (Dawson & 
Spannagle, 2009). 
 As at July 2009, the Protocol had been ratified by 183 countries and one regional 
community (European Union, EU) (Heilmayr & Lau, 2009). Kyoto-ratifying countries, also 
called Parties to the Protocol, have the rights to be involved in decision making in the COP as 
opposed to the Parties to the Convention, which are only eligible to contribute to negotiations 
in the COP (Dawson & Spannagle, 2009). The COP uses scientific evidence from the IPCC as 
the basis for international negotiation to tackle climate change. To date, the IPCC has released 
Assessment Reports in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007. In addition, the IPCC provides special 
reports and technical papers as per convention requests, such as the Special Report on 
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories to be used by Kyoto-ratifying countries 
to quantify and report their GHGs emissions to the Convention. 
 GHGs emissions to be reduced under the Protocol comprise six major greenhouse 
gases.2 According to global emissions data in 2005 from the World Resources Institute 
(Baumert et al., 2005), carbon dioxide (C02) ranks as the major contributor (77% of recorded 
gas emissions) to increased global warming, the major causes of which have been emitted from 
fossil fuel combustion (e.g. coal and oil) for energy use and land-use change (i.e. deforestation). 
Emissions from agriculture and waste, which both mainly come from developing countries, 
2 Six GHGs include carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofiuorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfiuorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
                                                          
release methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N20) having global warming proportions of 14% 
and 8%, respectively. 
A substantial amount of methane (CH4) is also released from fossil fuels in mining, processing 
and refining processes. Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6), which collectively are termed F-gases (fluorinated gases), jointly 
contribute to 1 % of global emissions. 
 These six GHGs have been measured in the 100-year horizon of Global Warming 
Potential (GWP), which is a relative measure of non-C02 compared with C02 emissions 
according to their disruptive effects on the atmosphere (Baumert et al., 2005). For instance, 1 
tonne of methane, which has a 21 GWP in the 100-year GWP time horizon according to the 
table developed by the IPCC, is equal to 21 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tC02-e). It 
means that methane has an impact on global warming that is 21 times more dangerous in its 
effects on the earth than C02 . The conversion of GHGs into GWP units aims to assist the 
Kyoto-ratifying countries in devising actions to control their GHGs emissions levels (Dawson 
& Spannagle, 2009). The measurement unit of GHGs in terms of carbon equivalent and the 
substantial warming contribution of C02 to anthropogenic climate change seem to be the reason 
why many media use the term 'carbon' to refer to all six greenhouse gases.3 
 As with the Convention, the Protocol classified participating countries into two major 
groups: Annex I countries, consisting of 41 industrialized, developed countries with high per 
capita emission profiles; and non-Annex I countries, comprising 151 developing countries. 
Annex I countries, excluding Belarus and Turkey which have not yet established their 1990 
emissions baseline targets, are termed Annex B Parties. Hence, Annex B Parties under the 
Protocol include 39 of 41 Annex I countries under the Convention. Annex I countries which 
are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 
further categorized into a subset known as Annex II. Following the UN classification, the 
Protocol also recognizes the 50 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within non-Annex I 
countries (Dawson & Spannagle, 2009). 
 As previously stated, the Kyoto Protocol requires no (mandatory) emissions targets for 
non-Annex I countries and varying emissions targets for different Annex I countries. There has 
been an interesting debate in international climate change negotiations as to the exclusion of 
developing countries from mandatory emissions reduction targets. Developed countries argue 
that developing countries should share the responsibility to slow down anthropogenic climate 
change. On the contrary, large developing countries including Brazil, China and India claim 
that the developed countries have polluted the environment for such a long time that they 
should take the lead to stabilize GHGs concentration in the atmosphere, as the huge costs to 
deal with climate change impact are unaffordable by developing countries in view of their 
economic development priorities (Bodansky, 2001). 
 However, the role of developing countries in combating worldwide climate change is 
crucial. As reported by the World Resources Institute (Baumert et al., 2005), developing 
countries were predicted to record the fastest growth of emissions levels with an estimated 84% 
increase during the period 2000-2025, in comparison to developed countries with an estimated 
35% growth. China, which was predicted to be the second largest contributor after Mexico in 
3 For the same reason, carbon will be used interchangeably with GHGs emissions in this paper. 
                                                          
this dramatic increase of forecast developing countries' emissions levels in 2000--2025 
(Baumert et al., 2005), replaced the US as the world's largest emitter in 2007. These shares of 
the global GHGs emissions level emphasize the need to put aside the debate on developed 
developing countries' responsibilities in combating climate change. It is clear that the 
developed countries need to work hand-in-hand with developing countries towards a low-
carbon economy. 
 As a result of this recognition, the Cancun Agreement was signed in December 2010 
by 89 countries with the aim of keeping GHG emissions rise less than 2 °C above preindustrial 
levels. These countries put forward their own (voluntary) targets to cut emissions levels by 
2020. Those signing the agreement pledged either to (1) have absolute emissions reduction 
targets (a percentage cut from the base year); (2) reduce emissions intensity (i.e. GHGs 
produced per unit of economic output); (3) cut emissions below business-as-usual (BAU) levels 
(i.e. future emissions with no emissions reduction policy as such). China's pledge was only a 
reduction in carbon intensity (as opposed to all GHG emissions). Some of the more important 
(non-binding) pledges are listed in Table 7 .1. However, the Kyoto Protocol remains the only 
document in which some countries have agreed to mandatory emissions reduction targets. 
 Strategies to deal with the impact of human-induced climate change under the UNFCC 
Convention include adaptation and mitigation. The former refers to adjustments to take account 
of the impact of climate change whereas the latter aims to curb GHGs emissions. A policy of 
adaptation will target specific climate change exposures, such as specific codes required for 
new building constructions in vulnerable areas of extreme-weather events, and early-warning 
systems for floods and forest fires. Meanwhile, mitigation policy has been directed at cutting 
emissions from BAU, such as carbon taxes, carbon allowances, carbon permits, carbon trading 
and incentives for the use of carbon-friendly technologies (Labatt & White, 2007). While the 
UNFCC Convention provides a wide range of optional mitigation and adaptation measures to 
be voluntarily adopted by its ratifying countries, we focus here on examining only the 
mitigation policy, as this will directly affect the economy and businesses operating in the 
initiating jurisdiction. 
 
 
 Similarly, the Protocol provides no model framework to be mandatorily applied by its 
participating countries. It prescribes three market mechanisms for ratifying countries to use in 
meeting their emissions reduction targets. First, the Protocol proposes to conduct an 
international emissions trading scheme (ETS) which allows the participating countries to 
multilaterally exchange carbon credits to meet their Kyoto Protocol obligations. Those 
countries with emissions reduction targets can engage business entities within their carbon-
rationing jurisdictions, by passing on these pollution limits. Here, by applying an ETS with a 
cap-and-trade system, a country may allocate permits to companies to emit a certain quantity 
of GHGs (the cap). An enterprise that emits less than its cap is allowed to trade its excess 
permits to a company that pollutes more than its cap. 
 The other two mechanisms are project-based instruments: Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects between industrialized (developed) countries; and Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) investment projects undertaken by industrialized countries to lessen GHG emissions in 
developing countries. The former project generates an Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) 
whereas the latter generates a Certified Emission Reduction (CER). Both can be traded in the 
carbon market (United Nations, 1998). The emergence of markets which determine a price for 
the right to pollute has resulted in what is called a carbonomics era (Ratnatunga & 
Balachandran, 2009), in which business decisions are made based on organizations' GHGs 
emission targets. 
 In summary, the UNFCC Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are the most influential 
treaties to encourage countries to deal with anthropogenic climate change. However, the extant 
climate change negotiations have not yet prescribed a policy framework to be mandatorily 
adopted globally. While the Protocol suggests three market mechanisms: ETS, JI and CDM to 
help its ratifying countries to meet their targets efficiently, the Parties to the Protocol may 
develop varied policy structures in their jurisdictions. The wide spectrum of climate change 
regulations across countries will in turn create different carbon regulation compliance regimes 
and will impose costs for businesses operating in different countries. The carbon policy 
instruments and their likely compliance costs in four selected jurisdictions (the EU, Australia, 
Indonesia and China) are discussed in the next section. 
 
National Carbon Policy Architectures and Compliance Costs 
Worldwide efforts towards a low carbon future require emissions control mechanisms to 
operate in both developed and developing countries. A wide variety of more than 1000 carbon 
policy measures were identified by the authors; most focusing on electricity generation and 
road transportation. Although some countries have introduced (or hope to introduce) ETSs, 
most countries have more limited, less direct measures, for example energy efficiency 
measures, subsidies for instalment of renewable energy sources, etc. These are listed in Table 
7 .2, which is based on carbon emissions reduction policies in nine countries: Australia, China, 
Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the US. 
 In this chapter, we look closely as the EU which is at the forefront of worldwide 
mitigation measures. The EU was the first jurisdiction to have a multi-national working system 
of carbon trading. Lessons that can be drawn from the EU's experience in developing a carbon 
policy and putting a price on carbon emissions through an ETS such as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Another developed country studied is Australia which 
is one of only three countries conferred with an increasing emissions target under the Protocol, 
even though Australia ranks as the largest GHGs emitting nation per capita among developed 
countries (Pearse, 2010). 
 We also investigate two developing countries which have been reported as having rapid 
growth in GHGs emissions because of different main polluting activities: China with its fossil 
fuel combustion and Indonesia with its deforestation. China's policies are useful to study in 
detail not only because of its current emissions levels, but also because of its projected 
contributions to global anthropogenic climate change. Among the developing countries, China 
was predicted to record the second largest emissions growth (118%) until 2025, behind Mexico 
(124%) (Baumert et al., 2005). China's high emissions level is largely due to its heavy reliance 
on coal-sourced energy, which was triggered by Mao's policies in the 1950s for China to be a 
self sufficient country, including internally supplied energy. Coupled with its economic boom 
and population growth, China surpassed America as the world's largest polluter in terms of 
cumulative level of emissions in 2007, but its emissions per head are still around one-fifth of 
those of the US (Giddens, 2009). 
   
 
 
 Another developing country looked at is Indonesia, a country with a 97% increase in 
C02 emissions during 1990-2002, which was recorded as having the fastest growth among 
developing countries, which together released 47% more C02 emissions in 2002 when 
compared to 1990 levels. According to the world emissions data in 2000, Indonesia, which was 
rated at 21st when counting only C02 emissions from fossil fuels, soared to the fourth highest 
when factoring in all gases from land use and nonC02 emissions (Baumert et al., 2005). 
Discussion on Indonesia's attempts to combat climate change aims to widen our understanding 
on different climate initiatives to address land-use problems, which may uncover the ability of 
tropical forests to absorb global carbon emissions. 
 
European Union 
The design of the EU carbonomics policy started off with a carbon tax proposal. In 1992, the 
European Commission (EC) set out an EU-wide carbon tax, which would be imposed once 
Japan and the US applied a similar carbon tax within their jurisdictions. Removing this 
condition in 1995, and then altering it to an energy tax in 1997, did not succeed in putting the 
carbon tax initiatives into operation because of rejections from many member states, most 
notably the UK, along with intense lobbying from affected businesses (Pinkse, 2007; 
Wettestad, 2005). 
 Under the Protocol, which was initially ratified by the 15 Member States (called EU-
15), the EU committed to collectively cut emissions levels as a community to 8% below their 
1990 levels during the period 2008-2012 (termed the 'EU bubble'), as an addendum to their 
individual emissions reduction targets as individual EU countries. Each member state is still 
obliged to achieve its agreed emissions reduction target that was assigned at the time of its 
Protocol ratification. To meet the Protocol target, the EC has developed around 40 EU-level 
policies and measures to lessen GHGs emissions, called the European Climate Change Program 
(ECCP), in addition to the domestic climate policies applied by its member states (Europa, 
2011b). 
 
The Current EU Emissions Reduction Mechanisms 
Central to the ECCP is the EU ETS as a market mechanism to cut emissions level efficiently 
(Europa, 2008a). The launching of the EU ETS on 1 January 2005 is based on Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, which later 
was amended three times by Directive 2004/101/EC, Directive 2008/101/EC and Directive 
2009/29/EC (Europa, 201lb). 
 The EU ETS works as a cap-and-trade system covering only carbon dioxide (C02) 
emissions as the major contributor of GHGs causing climate change. The EU ETS requires 
Member States to develop a detailed National Action Plan (NAP) that is in line with their 
individual targets under the Protocol. The NAP comprises the total quantity of allowances (the 
cap) and the distribution mechanism to entities in the first and second trading periods. Phase 1 
comprised the first three-year period from 2005 to 2007, whereas phase 2 coincides with the 
Protocol period, and consists of a five year period commencing on 1 January 2008. Each NAP 
had to be approved by the EC before the commencement of each phase (Europa, 2011 b ). 
 As at 1 January 2008, the EU ETS involved 27 EU member countries, as well as three 
members of the European Economic Area: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. It covered 
around 12,000 factories and plants which collectively account for nearly half of the EU's C02 
emissions. Industry sectors regulated under the EU legislation include the energy sector, iron 
and steel production and processing, the mineral industry and the wood pulp, paper and card 
industry (Europa, 2011 b). 
 These entities' obligations under ETS include monitoring and annually reporting their 
emissions to the government, and surrendering European Union Allowances (EUAs) to offset 
their carbon footprint each year. An allowance (EUA) refers to the right to emit 1 tonne of 
carbon dioxide (tC02) gas during a specified period. For phase 1, 95% of the EU As are 
allocated free, termed grandfathered, to entities. Even though phase 1 allowed the remaining 
5% of allowances to be auctioned, member countries allocated them free of charge except for 
Denmark, where the 5% of allowances was all auctioned (Burtraw & Kopp, 2007). During the 
second phase, countries must allocate only 90% of EUAs at no charge and auction the 
remaining 10%. In addition, Directive 2004/101/EC which linked the ETS to international 
project-based mechanisms under the Protocol, allows a certain amount of the Kyoto credits to 
be used for compliance purposed by EU regulated entities. The offset credits comprising: CERs 
from CDM and ERUs from JI projects, except for those generated by nuclear installations and 
those from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), can be traded in the same way 
as the EUAs in the EU ETS and ultimately can be surrendered for compliance (Europa, 201 
lb). 
 Each January, the EU As are allocated by each EU-country to large polluters in its 
jurisdiction. After their annual emissions report verified by the end of the following March, 
these liable entities should return the amount of EUAs back to the government to match their 
actual carbon footprint by the end of the following April. Entities that emit carbon more than 
their assigned caps will be penalized by an amount of EUR 40 (EUR 100) for each allowance 
in phase 1 (phase 2) and by the obligation to surrender an amount of allowances equal to the 
excess emissions (Europa, 2008b). Any surplus allowances can be traded among the EU-ETS 
participating entities, in over the counter, or on the Europe's climate exchange market. The 
traded allowances are recorded electronically, along with entities' verified emission data in the 
community independent transaction log (CITL) managed by a Central Administrator at EU 
level (Europa, 2008b ). 
 Even though the actual carbon price is determined by the market, the total number of 
carbon permits issued by the government during a particular trading phase seems to affect the 
carbon price. EAUs were traded in the carbon market with the prices ranged from €8 to €30 
during the first two years of the ETS (Labatt & White, 2007). While the transaction volume in 
the EU ETS revealed a steady increase from 262 to 1443 million tonnes during the pilot phase 
of 2005-2007, the market recorded a high volatility of spot prices, particularly during each 
compliance event when EUAs are due to be surrendered to the government. The verified 
emissions reports from each Member State were released in 2007, and these revealed that EUAs 
had been over-allocated by the Commissions. As a result, the carbon price of EUAs with 2007 
maturity plummeted to almost zero. The worthless carbon price at that time was not only 
because of over-allocated allowances, but also because the EUAs from the first phase were not 
bankable to be used in the following ETS periods (Chevallier, Ielpo, & Mercier, 2009). 
 To overcome the notable drawbacks in the first two trading periods, in 2008 the EU 
Commission announced changes in the upcoming 3rd phase of the EU ETS which will take 
place in an eight-year period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020. As set out in the 
Directive 2009/29/EC which came into effect in June 2009, phase 3 will apply the EU nation-
wide cap as opposed to varied caps determined by the NAP for individual countries. The cap 
for phase 3 will be lowered annually at a linear rate, from a 3% decrease in phase 2 to a 21 % 
reduction by 2020. Industry coverage and targeted GHGs emissions to be cut during phase 3 
have been expanded to include C02 from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium, and nitrous 
oxide from two sectors: the production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid, and the production 
of pertrofluorocarbons. This contrasts with the previous trading phases, where only C02 
emissions were required to be reduced. 
 Although unlimited banking of allowances from phase 2 to phase 3 is allowed, a more 
stringent allowance distribution scheme will be applied in phase 3. Allowances for the power 
generation sector will be 100% auctioned from 2013 onwards. The remaining sectors under the 
EU ETS will need to acquire 20% of their caps through auction in 2013, increasing to 70% in 
2020. Carbon credits generated from Kyoto project-based mechanisms that can be used to 
comply with the EU ETS will be limited up to 50% of the EU carbon footprint. In addition, the 
inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS is to commence in 2012 under the Aviation 
Directive 2008/101/EC. 
 These directive series are part of the EU Climate and Energy Package released in 
December 2008, whereby the EU put forward its dual commitments to further limit GHGs 
emissions. The EU has aimed to cut its emissions to 20% of their 2000 levels by 2020, 
regardless of other countries' commitments to control their pollution. This unconditional pledge 
was called 20-20-20. Another commitment a 30% target will also be sought on condition that 
the rest of both heavy-polluting developed and developing countries agree to contribute to 
global emissions reductions with their relevant responsibilities and capabilities. 
 Along with the carbon trading scheme, the EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package also 
set out a 20% renewable energy target and 20% energy efficiency by 2020 as part of its climate 
change strategy. The renewable energy policy aims to shift from its reliance on fossil fuels 
combustion (i.e. 80%) for energy use to green electricity through diversification of renewable 
energy sources, such as wind, solar (thermal and photovoltaic), hydro-power, geothermal and 
biomass. In the transport sector, the aim is to replace 10% of transport fuel with renewable 
fuels by 2020 so as to cut C02 emissions from vehicles. Energy efficiency policy seeks to 
reduce the level of energy consumption of the EU community. Improved energy efficiency 
from household and commercial building has been sought by tightening standards for 
buildings, hot water and heating system installations, and insisting higher efficiency standards 
in household appliances (Europa, 201la). 
 In short, the climate policy landscape in the EU charges polluters a carbon price through 
the ETS and demands higher levels of energy efficiency. This is summarized in Table 7.3. 
 The wide range of carbon and energy policies applied in the EU suggests that it is not 
an easy task for businesses operating in this region to quantify their likely compliance costs. 
This explains why to date very few studies have explored this topic. One of the few pioneer 
studies in carbon compliance costs is the study by Betz (2006) of sites in Germany that have 
adopted the EU ETS requirements. It estimated two types of compliance costs: initial and on-
going costs. Start-up compliance costs are the initial costs to establish an internal system within 
a firm to adopt the EU ETS requirements, for instance, administration for monitoring and 
reporting; quantifying emissions for the base period; the external verification costs; and legal 
costs, if any. Recurrent compliance costs comprise relevant costs associated with strategy and 
risk management; monitoring and reporting emissions and their verification; accounting  
 
functions to report allowances in financial reports; adapting to registered software and trading 
platform, and penalties and sanctions, if any. Excluding the €40 sanctions per tonnes of 
allowance shortfall and the market trading cost of allowances, Betz (2006) estimated that the 
start-up costs and recurrent costs of complying with the EU ETS are between €50,000-60,000 
once-off, and around €35,000 pa, respectively, per liable installation in Germany. These 
estimates may be lower in other EU countries due to the more complex system in German 
compared to others. 
 A slightly different way of quantifying carbon compliance costs was developed by 
Lund (2007), who calculated the additional costs borne by affected industries due to the levels 
of carbon emissions reduction mandated by the ETS directives and the associated increased 
electricity prices. The total costs of the EU ETS directives, hence, can be broken down into 
direct costs and indirect costs. The former consist of costs caused by the firm's obligation to 
comply with the 8% emissions reduction during the Kyoto period 2008-2012, and assuming 
the 30% target will be applied during phase 3 ETS 2013-2020. In contrast, the latter refers to 
the incremental costs because of the impact of the ETS on the electricity sector that leads to 
increased electricity prices. 
 Therefore, only direct costs have been borne by electricity sector Lund (2007). This 
sector was estimated to have the highest direct compliance costs among the other ETS sectors, 
around 2% of its production value during phase 2, increasing to 13% during phase 3 ETS, 
respectively. For the other four non-power sectors covered by the ETS - the paper, oil refining, 
steel and cement industries - the total cost of complying with the ETS Directives was calculated 
to be less than 2% (8%) of the value of production by curbing emissions to 8% (30%) of BAU 
levels during the Kyoto (past-Kyoto) period. Conversely, the non-Kyoto sectors that will be 
affected only by indirect costs, that is, users hit by the ensuing higher electricity prices, are 
those industries with electricity-intensive production processes. Lund (2007) reported that the 
two most highly affected sectors after the power sector raised electricity prices are the chlorine 
and aluminium industries, with around 10% increased cost of their production value during 
2008-2012, predicted to rise up to approximately 15% during 2013-2020. Lund's study (2007) 
provides evidence that the ETS will charge not only big polluters covered by the scheme, but 
also will impose costs on industries outside the scheme through the increased electricity prices 
transferred along the input supply chain. 
 
Australia 
The Australian Federal Government ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 3 December 2007 (Franklin, 
Ryan, Warren, & Fitzpatrick, 2007), thus committing Australia to cut GHG emissions. Under 
the Protocol, Australia is one of only six Annex I countries that have been allowed not to cut 
their emissions during the Kyoto commitment period - Australia was allocated 108% of its 
1990 emissions level, Iceland 110%, Norway 101 %, and a constant level 100% was allocated 
to Russia, the Ukraine and New Zealand (Dawson & Spannagle, 2009). However, the 
Australian government aims to reduce GHG emissions by 25% on 2000 levels by 2020 
(Australian Government: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010b). 
 Similar to the EU, the Australian Government set out the national landscape of its 
climate change mitigation policy in a White Paper (Australian Government, 2008) that included 
an ETS as the main market mechanism to curb emissions, to complement its existing energy 
policy. The following section details the current Australian law which mandates annual 
reporting of GHGs emissions and energy use by liable entities to support the future ETS. The 
evolving implementation timeline and the main features of the likely carbon market in Australia 
are also discussed, as are the complementary national climate change regulations addressing 
renewable energy, known as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), and existing 
state-level climate policies. 
 
The Proposed Australian Emissions Reduction Mechanisms 
The Australia Government initially intended to commence an Australian Emissions Trading 
Scheme (AETS) on 1July2010. It was proposed that the ABTS would cover all six GHGs and 
would use the cap-and-trade system (National Emissions Trading Taskforce, 2007). In May 
2009, it was announced that the commencement of the ABTS, now renamed the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme ( CP RS), was to be postponed until l July 2011 due to the impact 
of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). To facilitate business recovery from the global economic 
downturn, the announcement also outlined some changes in the design of the original ABTS: 
(1) introduction of a fixed price of AU$ l 0 per tCOre emissions for the first year of operation 
and (2) provision of further assistance, including increased free carbon credit allocation to 
industry and power generators (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2011). 
 The legislation to commence CPRS from 2011 was rejected by the Australian 
Parliament on 13 August and again on 2 December 2009. The rejections were mainly due to 
the Green Party's argument that the CPRS bill set out emissions targets that were too low and 
provided too generous compensation to the coal and power industries. The revised CPRS 
legislation was re-introduced to the Parliament on 2 February 2010. Considering the lack of 
support to pass the CPRS legislation and the slow global action on climate change, on 27 April 
2010, the Federal Government announced a further delay to the implementation of the CPRS 
to 2013 (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2011 ). 
 The proposal, called the Carbon Price Mechanism, to put a price on carbon pollution 
was brought back to the policy arena with the Federal government's announcement of its 
proposed carbon pricing architecture on 24 February 2011 (Multi-Party Climate Change 
Committee [MPCCC], 2011). The blue-print set out a hybrid scheme, with a fixed price phase 
(effectively like a carbon tax) starting from 1 July 2012, converting to a floating price under a 
cap-and-trade ETS. The fixed carbon price will gradually increase at a pre-set rate for a period 
of three years from 2012. 
 The hybrid pricing scheme will charge all six GHGs emissions from electricity 
generators, transport, industry and fugitive emissions from mining, as well as waste. The 
agriculture sector will be excluded due to the complexity of counting agricultural emissions. 
To this end, further details of the hybrid scheme, such as the starting price of emissions permits, 
the assistance measures for businesses, and the transition rules from a fixed to flexible carbon 
price mechanism, have yet to be determined. The pricing scheme enabling legislation is 
expected to pass by the end of 2011, and come into operation on 1 July 2012 (Multi-Party 
Climate Change Committee, 2011). 
 
GHGs Emissions Reporting in Australia 
To underpin the proposed CPRS, on 28 September 2007 The Parliament of Australia (2007) 
passed the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, No. 175, 2007 (the NGER 
Act 2007, hereafter) which established the National Greenhouse Energy Reporting System 
(NGERS) as a single framework for mandatory reporting. The NGERS enables the Federal 
Government to collect annual GHGs emissions and energy use data from organizations which 
meet certain thresholds starting from 1 July 2008. The reporting thresholds comprise two 
levels: facility and corporate thresholds. The facility threshold remains the same overtime, and 
will apply to entities with a facility emitting at least 25 kilo-tonnes (kt) of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (ktCOre) GHGs, or using (producing or consuming) at least 100 terajoules (TJ) of 
energy. The threshold for a corporate group which is defined to consist of a controlling 
company, its controlled subsidiaries, its joint ventures and its partnerships is 125 ktC02-e 
emissions or 500 TJ of energy use. The corporate thresholds are to be gradually lowered 
overtime, to 87 .5 ktCOre emissions or 350 TJ of energy for the 2009-2010 reporting year and 
to 50 ktCOre emissions or 200 TJ of energy for the 2010-2011 reporting years and thereafter 
(Australian Government: ComLaw, 2007). 
 The NGERS reporting year goes from 1 July to 30 June, by which time entities meet 
the annual thresholds. The covered entities must register by 31 August and report by 31 
October. The emissions data that should be reported comprises the direct and indirect emissions 
of all six GHGs mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol, which are known as scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions, respectively. To facilitate the single streamlined national reporting point, the 
government provides a web-based data collection system called OSCAR - Online System for 
Comprehensive Activity Reporting (Australian Government: ComLaw, 2007). 
 Under section 24 of the NGER Act 2007, the emissions and energy data of corporate 
entities emitting a total of scope 1 and scope 2 emissions that meet reporting thresholds will be 
published online by 28 February in the following year by the Greenhouse and Energy Data 
Officer (GEDO). In the first reporting period 2008-2009, the GEDO released a report that 
detailed emissions and energy-use data by 233 entities emitting at least 125 ktC02-e. In line 
with the lower reporting threshold to 87.5ktCOre in the second reporting year 2009-2010, the 
liable entities reported on by GEDO increased to 300 corporations (Australian Government: 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010a). 
 While an Australia-wide carbon trading scheme is still in the proposal stage, the extant 
climate policies that have been in operation in Australia include one national and five state-
level policy instruments. These policies mainly address Australia's problem in electricity 
generation which was recorded as having the highest carbon intensity in the developed world 
(Daley & Edis, 2011 ). A coal price which is relatively cheaper in Australia than in other 
developed countries, and the inefficient use of coal in its power stations, are the main reasons 
why Australia has relied heavily on coal for electricity production and has emitted a high level 
of carbon pollution. 
 Another Australia Federal Government policy tool to lower GHGs emissions is the 
National 20% MRET. The MRET was implemented by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Act 2000. Under this Act, the Renewable Energy Target (RET) is to generate an extra 9500 
gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity supply in Australia from renewable energy sources 
annually by 2010 (Hodgkinson & Garner, 2008). 
 The MRET has been underway since April 2001 as the first mandatory RET regime 
across the globe (Kent & Mercer, 2006). The MRET scheme mandates that wholesale 
purchasers of electricity (retailers and large energy users) will proportionally contribute to 
national renewable energy generation. The entities compelled to meet the MRET need to 
surrender Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), each representing 1 MWh of electricity 
generation from renewable energy. The sources of renewable energy under the scheme include 
hydro, wind, solar, tidal, geothermal aquifers, hot rocks and landfill gas. A liable entity that 
fails to meet its assigned target must pay a penalty of AU$40 per MWh (Hodgkinson & Garner, 
2008). 
 Approaching the end of this initial RET scheme, in May 2009 the Government 
announced an expanded RET to account for 20% of renewable energy sources by 2020. This 
equates to an additional 45,000 GWh renewable energy generation per year, close to five times 
that of the previous RET. This enhanced RET scheme was established under the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2010 (Australian Government: Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency, 201 lb). 
 Notwithstanding the absence of a national carbon market in Australia, a state level ETS, 
the New South Wales (NSW) Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS),4 has operated 
since 1 January 20035 as one of the world's first mandatory ETS mechanisms (GGAS, 2008). 
It aims to curb GHGs emissions from electricity consumption by proportionally distributing 
the state-level emissions reduction target to all NSW electricity retailers based on their market 
shares. The entities with assigned emissions targets have to surrender NSW Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Certificates (NGACs) annually to demonstrate their compliance. Compliance 
failure will result in a penalty of AU$12 per tonne shortfall. Unlike the cap-and-trade system 
which is the likely design for the future federal CPRS, the NSW GGAS works under a baseline 
and credit mechanism. Here, the tradable credits are limited to the discrepancy between 
emissions reduction from BAU and the target (baseline). 
 Another State level initiative is the Queensland Government Gas Electricity Target 
(GE1). This Scheme commenced on 1 January 2005 under the Electricity Act 1994 
(Department of Employment Economic Development and Innovation, 2011), to promote a shift 
from coal to gas-sourced power for cutting carbon pollution. The scheme sought to achieve 
progressive targets from 13% to 15% in 2010. The gasfired generation target remains at 15% 
in 2011 with a possibility of increasing it to 18% by 2020. 
 The scheme with a 15% target requires electricity retailers to source 15% of their 
electricity sold in Queensland from gas-fired generation. These electricity retailers, who fall 
under the scheme, must annually surrender a number of Gas Electricity Certificates (GECs) 
that equates to their annual liabilities. A GEC can be created by accredited generators on each 
megawatt hour (MWh) of eligible gas-fired electricity generated, which then can be transferred 
and be sold to other scheme participants, to be ultimately surrendered to the regulator for 
4 GGAS is the acronym of its previous name, that is Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. 
Although the scheme has been renamed into the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, the 
acronym GGAS has been retained (Betz, MacGill, & Passey, 2011). 
5 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) joined GGAS since 2005. 
                                                          
compliance purposes. Liable entities which fail to meet their targets will face a dollar penalty 
that is calculated based on a certain formulae as prescribed in associated regulation. 
 Yet another State-based scheme, the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Scheme 
(VEE1) was established by the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Act 2007, and aims to cut 
GHGs emissions by increasing the efficient use of electricity and gas in Victoria (Essential 
Services Commission, 2011). To achieve Victoria's overall emissions reduction to 60% by 
2050, the scheme was designed to run in three-year phases from 1 January 2009 to 31 
December 2029. Under the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Scheme Regulations 2008 that 
sets out the first phase of VEET, gas and electricity retailers in Victoria must annually surrender 
Victorian Energy Efficiency Certificates (VEECs) to the Essential Service Commission to 
match their assigned liabilities for the previous calendar year. The obligations to acquire the 
VEEC certificates are assigned to liable entities based on their market shares of the overall 
scheme target. 
 One VEEC demonstrates that the holder abated 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions (tCOre) through prescribed activities, including more efficient water heating, space 
heating, space conditioning, lighting, shower roses, refrigerators/ freezer, televisions and 
clothes dryers. VEECs can be transferred or traded between the scheme participants. Liable 
entities that surrender insufficient VEECs will be penalized by the Essential Service 
Commission with A U$40 per shortfall VEEC for the 2010 compliance year. Approaching the 
end of each scheme phase, a successor regulation detailing the prescribed activities to abate 
carbon emissions and the level of penalties for the next phase will be released to incorporate 
the revised scheme target. 
 The South Australian state introduced the Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme 
(REES) which aims to cut carbon emissions through reducing energy consumption at the 
household level (The Essential Service Commission of South Australia, 2011). Under 
regulation provided by the Electricity Act 1996 and the Gas Act 1997, the REES scheme was 
designed to operate for a three-year period commencing from 1 January 2009. Energy retailers 
with at least 5000 electricity or gas residential customers are required to provide energy 
efficient activities and an energy audit that will potentially lower households' energy bills. 
Energy efficient activities, for instance ceiling insulation, replacement of inefficient lighting 
with compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), installing low-flow showerheads and replacing 
inefficient heating or cooling systems, are available for all South Australian households. A set 
number of energy audits are intended for targeted low-income households, the so-called 
priority groups, to identify practical ways to save energy and minimize energy bills. Certificates 
that will be granted to retailers who perform these required activities are not tradable 
instruments, and will only be issued to demonstrate their compliance with the REES regulation. 
 A final State-based initiative is the NSW Energy Efficiency Scheme, which 
commenced on 1 July 2009. This scheme operates in a similar way to the Victorian Energy 
Efficiency Target (VEET) scheme. The NSW scheme seeks to achieve an energy efficiency 
target of 0.4% of total electricity sales, increasing to 4% in the period 2014-2020 (Energy 
Savings Scheme Administrator, 2011). The scheme participants comprise all energy retailers, 
which have been assigned annual energy saving targets according to their proportional size of 
electricity generation in NSW. Failure to surrender sufficient Energy Saving Certificates 
(ESCs) will be penalized AU$23.03 (AU$23.99) per tC02-e shortfall for compliance year 2010 
(2011). 
 In summary, while the initiative to run an Australian ETS has been announced as one 
of the main Australia climate policies, the associated regulations regarding its practical 
mechanism are still in the negotiation process at the policy table. To this end, business entities 
that will potentially fall under the Australian scheme have been required to annually submit 
their GHGs emissions and energy use reports to underpin the future Australian ETS. However, 
to cut its reliance on coal-sourced power which has emitted substantial amounts of carbon 
pollution, Australia started shifting to renewable energy through the establishment of MRET 
in 2001. 
 Similarly, extant climate change actions in Australian states address energy policies 
(see Table 7.4). Among the five state-level schemes outlined in the table, all schemes except 
the South Australia REES, use tradable instruments as the currencies in market mechanisms. 
The relatively new energy policies which commenced in 2009 - that is VEET, SA REES and 
NSW EES - all seek to achieve energy consumption reduction through an energy efficiency 
scheme. The different energy regulatory requirements in different states reveal that the energy 
retailer industries operate in a competitive carbonomics environment with complex carbon 
compliance costs. They have been required to cut emissions both in their input and output 
supply chains through renewable energy generation and energy efficiency measures, 
respectively. The note, however, that there exists no study examining the compliance costs 
with the present National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS) and the five 
energy policies as listed below, that have been borne by the affected industries in Australia. 
 In terms of which policy works best in delivering emissions reductions, a recent report 
from the Grattan Institute (Daley & Edis, 2011) highlights the performance of market-based 
measures among more than 300 emissions reduction programmes and policies that have been 
deployed by the Federal and State Governments since 1997. The three market mechanisms - 
the Australian-wide RET, the NSW and ACT GGAS, and the Queensland GET - altogether 
have contributed to more than 40% of Australia's emissions reduction since 1997. Energy 
efficiency regulatory standards were recommended to be put as complementary measures due 
to their slow speed in cutting emissions levels but delivering benefits to community. Whereas 
grant-tendering programmes and rebate policies were noted to be costly with only minor results 
to lower emissions levels. 
 It is noteworthy that these market mechanisms have attained the targeted emissions cut 
by providing their scheme participants with certainty and flexibility. By using a market 
mechanism, the Australian Government initially set out the overall emissions reduction target 
in terms of tonnes of C02-e or megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable energy generation. The 
target is subsequently distributed to liable entities that must surrender a number of certificates 
or permits that equates their assigned targets. The regulations detailing such scheme rules and 
signalling carbon permit or certificate prices provide certainty for businesses which encourages 
taking up investments on low or zero emissions technology. Business entities that fall under 
such schemes have the flexibility to devise the most cost-effective way to fulfil their emission 
reduction obligations by either creating or purchasing certificates or permits, or paying the 
compliance failure fines for any shortfall. 
 
  In term of costs that have to be borne by businesses, similar to the EU, there has been 
little attempt to study carbon compliance costs in Australia. It is noted that only Pope and Owen 
(2009) have sought to estimate the costs of complying with Australian proposed CPRS. 
Arguing that the figures calculated by Betz (2006) in her German case study are credibly 
comparable for Australian firms, they used the currency rate at that time to estimate that the 
costs would become around AU$100,000-120,000 and AU$70,000 per site for start-up and 
recurrent compliance costs. These numbers are questionable as Betz's findings may not be 
directly transferrable in Australia. Further data collection is required to determine exactly how 
much the carbon compliance costs in Australia. 
 
China 
China's roadmap in developing its carbon policy resembles that of Australia. This similar 
pattern is likely due to their similar heavy reliance on coal to fuel their economies. China has 
begun to improve its energy sector by increasing energy efficiency and its energy mix, which 
in turn will curb carbon emissions. A brief history of China's energy policies, its climate 
policies and China's role in international GHGs mitigation trough Kyoto's project-based 
mechanism called CDMs, are presented in this section. 
 
China's Energy Policy 
China's record on energy use is closely linked with its economic boom. China recorded a 
quadrupled Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accompanied by a double growth in energy 
consumption during 1980-2000. In 2001, China announced its aim to repeat this success by 
setting a target to accelerate its economic growth up to four times within the period 2001-2020, 
again by using a double level of energy consumption (Heggelund, 2007). This increasing 
energy demand poses a serious problem for China as its fossil fuel resources have been 
substantially depleted. Hence the security of energy supply, including electricity supply, has 
been one of the priority areas in China's economic development agenda. Since the Reform and 
Opening Up in 1978, various energy policies, covering both energy efficiency and energy mix 
policies, have been implemented in China (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). 
 The remarkable milestone in China's energy policies is the establishment of legally 
binding targets. In its 11th Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development that was 
announced in 2005, China set out a target to cut 20% of energy consumption per unit GDP - 
termed energy intensity - in 2010 compared to a 2005 baseline. This national target has been 
broken down into a 4% annual reduction, and has been allocated to each province as a quota 
with a 4% reduction rate per annum. Each province is free to develop its own policy to meet 
its assigned target. To ensure its compliance, a punishment system was designed at two levels: 
provincial government and its officials (Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Xu, Sun, Wennersten, & Brandt, 
2010). The provincial government that fails to meet its assigned target will face two 
punishments: (1) will be assigned a negative credit in its work evaluation and (2) will be 
required to develop a programme to meet the missed target within a month to implement the 
programme in an approved time period. The specific record for the relevant officials working 
in that provincial government will be linked to the promotion system and will hamper their 
future careers. 
 The energy efficiency policies are not only imposed through provincial governments, 
but are also directed to regulate business industries. The Outline of China's Energy Saving 
Technology Policies launched in 2006 mandates installing large highefficiency plants to 
replace small power plants throughout China. In 2006, 2007 and 2008, hundreds of small 
inefficient thermal plants with a total capacity of 3.14, 14.38 and 16.69 GW were shut down. 
These closed plants were replaced by efficient ones, and enabled annual savings of up to 32.6 
million tons of coal (Xu et al., 2010). Up to 2010, the closure of polluting power plants 
accounted for over 70 GW of power generation. This figure exceeds the recorded Australian 
national electricity market generation which was below 50 GW in the 2009-2010 period 
(Australian Government: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 201 la). 
 Another initiative to promote industrial energy efficiency is the Top 1000 Energy 
Consuming Enterprise Program which was announced in 2005 and come into operation in early 
2006 (Levine & Aden, 2008; Price & Xuejun, 2007). This programme involves large-scale 
firms in nine main consuming industries - iron and steel, petroleum and petrochemicals, 
chemicals, electric power generation, nonferrous metals, coal mining, construction materials, 
textiles and pulp and paper - which together made up 33% of national and 47% of industrial 
energy use in 2004. Each of these firms was assigned a 2010 energy consumption target. The 
required activities from the Top 1000 firms include benchmarking, energy audits, 
developments of energy saving action plans, information and training workshops and annual 
reporting of energy consumption. The Top 1000 programme sought to save energy of 100 
million tons of coal equivalent (Mtce) from these heavy-energy use firms in 2010. The target 
of the Top 1000 programme target was also linked to the performance evaluation of provincial 
governments and their related officials to ensure this programme meets its objective. 
 In an effort to promote a better energy mix, China enacted the Renewable Energy Law 
in 2005 to come into effect in January 2006. This law seeks to generate 15% of China's energy 
from renewable resources by 2020. It set out the obligations of the government, business 
entities and users in developing and using renewable energy. A series of policies and measures 
that were developed under this law includes a total volume target, mandatory grid connection, 
price management regulation, differentiated pricing and favourable taxing. A favourable 
pricing scheme has been attached to renewable electricity that is fed into the grid, and the 
society must share the incremental cost of this feed-in tariff. Favourable taxing aims to 
discourage fossil fuel use. For instance, commencing in 2001 a value-added tax (VAT) of 17% 
has been imposed on coal power plants, whereas wind power plants have been charged 8. 5 % 
VAT. A resource tax on fossil fuels were raised in 200 5 and again in 2009 to restrict their 
exploitation (Xu et al., 2010). 
 
China's Climate Policy 
The first official document detailing its global warming policy framework, China's National 
Climate Change Programme, was released on 4 June 2007 (National Development and Reform 
Commission [NDRC], 2007). It set out China's actions up to 2010 to tackle climate change by 
restructuring its economy, promoting clean technologies and improving energy efficiency. 
However, there is no specific target for carbon emissions reduction in this policy. The 
programme reiterates the energy targets that were outlined in its 11th Five-Year Plan: a 20% 
reduction of energy intensity and a 10% increase in the renewable energy proportion of its 
primary energy supply in 2010, on the baseline of 2005 levels. Because the main element of 
this national plan addressed energy use, it seems that China's climate policy is its energy policy. 
The initiatives in the energy industry that are expected to subsequently deliver emissions cuts 
are summarized in Table 7.5. 
 Two following white papers: (1) China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate 
Change released in October 2008 (Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2008) and (2) China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 
- The Progress Report (NDRC, 2009) published in October 2009, mainly deal with energy 
policy. The latter reveals that China strived to achieve the 20% energy intensity target by 
achieving a performance of 10.1 % for 2006--2008 and 3.35% for the first half of 2009. In 
addition, the report highlighted the substantially growing scale of its renewable energy 
industry. 
 A specific target on carbon emissions reduction was ultimately announced in the latest 
China's blueprint document, 12th Five-Year Plan, which was released on 14 March 2011 
(China Economic Net, 2011). It separates targets for energy intensity and C02 emissions per 
unit of GDP, namely 16% and 17% reductions from 2010 levels by 2015, respectively. An 
increase in the proportion of non-fossil fuels to be used in energy generation was targeted to 
reach 11.4% by 2015. These targets are in line with China's pledge to cut 40 to 45% its carbon 
intensity by 2020 on the 2005 baseline level that was announced in the UN climate meetings 
in Copenhagen in 2009 and in Cancun in 2010. The plan also seeks to increase forest coverage 
rate to 21.66% and to increase forest stock by 600 million cm3 by 2015. It is noteworthy that 
China plans to launch a pilot ETS in six provinces in 2013, then establish its nation-wide ETS 
from 2015 (Reuters, 2011). The ETS will be set as a market mechanism based on energy 
consumption targets. 
 
 
Clean Development Mechanisms in China 
Another area of China's active participation in supporting the Kyoto Protocol is via CDMs. 
CDMs serve two main purposes: (1) to enable developed countries generating Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) from GHGs mitigation projects in developing countries to 
comply with their Kyoto binding targets and (2) to facilitate sustainable developments in 
developing countries. The recent report from the Pew Centre on Global Climate Change 
(Gillenwater & Seres, 2011) showed that China is the largest source of CERs, accounting for 
over 40% of all registered CDM projects undertaken during 2008-2012 in more than 80 hosting 
countries. 
 In summary, in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006--2010), China set a 20% reduction target 
in energy per unit GDP. In 2007, another energy target to increase 10% of renewable energy 
usage was announced in China's climate strategy blueprint setting out mitigation and adaptation 
initiatives. This official climate document, which mainly addresses China's energy security, 
seems to be directed at assisting the achievement of economic development target to quadruple 
GDP growth during 2000-2020. The energy sector, which remains a primary focus in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, has been the most affected industry in China's green policies. 
 
 A specific target of emissions reduction was first included in the recently released 12th 
Five-Year Plan. As shown in Table 7.6, the target of China's energy intensity use has decreased 
from 2006-2010 to the 2011-2015 period. This is likely due to the achievement in the previous 
period which did not fully fulfil the 20% target. The inclusion of a quantified target on carbon 
emissions reduction in most recent China's development plan implies that China has shifted its 
stance on climate change from putting it as a foreign-policy issue regarding the increasing 
global scrutiny on its high emissions level, to be a part of a domestic policy agenda. 
 
Indonesia 
Similar to China, Indonesia faces a complex situation regarding its high emissions level 
(Indonesian Fiscal Policy Office, 2008). With its rapidly increasing rate of deforestation, illegal 
logging, forest fires and peat land conversion (see Friends of the Earth, Life Mosaic, & Sawit 
Watch, 2008, for details), Indonesia is the second highest contributor after Brazil to global 
emissions from land-use changes. Taking out land-use changes, Indonesia's cumulative six 
GHGs emissions was ranked 12th in 2005 global emissions level based on the Climate Analysis 
Indicator Tool database.6 This implies that energy has also been a problem for Indonesia, which 
is the fourth most populated country in the world. On the other hand, the coal consuming 
country Indonesia is still striving to accelerate its economic development, especially directed 
to poverty alleviation in its growing population. Despite the entangled issues and no Kyoto 
binding target to curb emissions, Indonesia has shown a commitment to combat climate change. 
 Indonesia's focus on climate change has increased considerably since its hosting of the 
UN climate meeting COP13 in Bali in December 2007. Moreover, in the G20 summit in 
Pittsburgh in September 2009, Indonesia for the first time pledged to reduce GHGs emissions 
6 The Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT) is free online database provided by the World 
Resource Institute to compare various climate change indicators among countries and regions 
across the globe. 
 
                                                          
by 26%, and up to 41 % with developed countries' support, by 2020, compared to its BAU 
trajectory. This pledge was subsequently declared at the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. 
 Prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, Indonesia launched a green paper entitled 
Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for Climate Change Mitigation in Indonesia (Ministry 
of Finance, 2009) that was jointly developed with Australia through the Australia Indonesia 
Partnership. The green paper set out Indonesia's climate mitigation plans which focus on two 
main areas, the energy sector and LULUCF. Central to this plan is the proposal to impose a 
carbon price starting from the energy sector, commencing 2014. Emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion upstream for liquid fuels as well as downstream emissions from electricity 
generators and large industrial installations will be taxed. The tax will start from 80,000 rupiah 
(US$8) per tC02-e in 2014, with an increase of 5% annually until 2020. Once the established 
system can facilitate to charge a carbon price beyond fossil fuel combustion in energy sector, 
the government will start shifting to an ETS and will in turn link it with international scheme. 
It appears that Indonesia's carbon price proposal is similar to the previously discussed Australia 
hybrid carbon pricing scheme. 
 Another initiative in the energy sector set out in the green paper is to optimally utilize 
geothermal energy, a renewable energy with almost zero carbon emissions. As the country with 
the largest share of geothermal resources in the world (41 % ), Indonesia at that time was using 
only 3 % of its resources. The enforced use of geothermal energy will ease Indonesia's 
dependence on coal as the main fuel source for power plants. 
 In terms of addressing LULUCF which is the major contributor to Indonesia's 
emissions, the green paper identifies two policies, the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
mechanism and the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) 
mechanism. The former aims to use the central government financial supports to incentivize 
regional governments to take up climate mitigation actions. REDD, a concept adopted in COP 
13 meeting in Indonesia, was designed to provide financial rewards from industrialized 
countries to tropical developing countries, based on the carbon stored in forests. A broader 
mechanism to include 'conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries', as outlined in the Bali Action Plan paragraph 1 
(b) (iii), is termed REDD+. Indonesia signed a bilateral REDD+ agreement with Norway in 
May 2010 for receiving up to AU$1 billion for reducing deforestation, forest degradation and 
loss of peat lands. This partnership was designed to run in three phases, with AU$100 million 
paid up front and the remaining as contributions – as delivery (see Austin, Stolle, & Gingold, 
2010, for details and progress). It should be noted that very few forestry CDM projects have 
been registered because the approval procedures for forestry CDM project was deemed to be 
cumbersome and few buyers are interested in the CERs from forestry projects. While 
afforestation and deforestation are eligible to generate CERs, avoided deforestation is excluded 
from CDM. As of 1 May 2010, Indonesia only has one registered afforestation CDM project 
(UNEP Risoe Centre, 2011). 
 The following year after the release of the green paper, a set of more comprehensive 
policies, the Indonesia Climate Change Sectoral Roadmap (ICCSR), was officially launched 
by BAPPENAS in March 2010 (Republic of Indonesia - BAPPENAS, 2010). The ICCSR 
addresses both mitigation and adaptation actions. Sectoral roadmap on mitigation covers 
health, water resources, agriculture and coastal, as well as marine and fisheries. Five sectors 
targeted for mitigation measures include forestry, energy, industry, transportation and waste 
management. Accounting for only key policies and measures in these emissions mitigation 
plans of the ICCSR will collectively deliver a 23. 7% reduction in GHGs emissions compared 
to the BAU level in 2020. Although mitigation in the forest sector offers considerable 
reductions with lower costs, the government noted the importance of keeping the balance of 
the mitigation efforts among other sectors so as to achieve the wider shifting impacts from a 
BAU scenario towards a low-carbon future. 
 Turning back to CDM projects, statistics recorded by UNEP (UNEP Risoe Centre, 
2011) show that as of 1 May 2011 Indonesia has been hosting only 1.85% CDM projects which 
contributed to 1.40% CERs generated worldwide. These very small figures are in contrast to 
China's successful CDM performance. Three reasons for this low number of CDM projects in 
Indonesia are: (1) lack of regulations and incentives specifically concerning CDM to encourage 
private sector participation, (2) lack of transparency and accountability of state-owned 
enterprise and agencies as to conventional and renewable energy sources and (3) lack of 
knowledge and awareness of CDM (Miyaguchi & Shaw, 2008). These factors impede private 
sector engagement in CDM projects that potentially miss the opportunity to obtain CERs from 
their energy efficiency and conservation projects. 
 Summing up, the recently developed climate policies in Indonesia appear to seek a 20% 
emissions reduction target by 2020. The relevant laws and regulations to put these policies into 
operation remain to be developed. In particular the carbon tax in the energy sector designed by 
the Ministry of Finance, which was not mentioned in the ICCSR developed by BAPPENAS, 
implies that the carbon tax proposal is not likely to be implemented in the near future. 
 
Summary 
The discussion in this chapter emphasizes that the collective action from developed and 
developing countries is compulsory to effectively combat anthropogenic climate change. A 
cleaner energy future, including a carbon-free electricity sector are crucial ingredients to shift 
to a low-carbon future. The successor of the Kyoto Protocol (if any) should incorporate energy 
policies and mechanism to address land-use changes and forestry. 
 Currently, there is much variation in how Kyoto-ratifying countries have transformed 
their commitments to curb carbon emissions into their domestic policies and practices (Table 
7.1). In the countries examined in this chapter, an ETS appears to be favoured as the market 
mechanism to curb emissions, to complement their extant energy policies for decarbonizing 
their economies. The developed countries reveal to commit putting an ETS on top of their 
climate mitigation policies, but usually introduced only after energy-related policies come into 
operation. 
 However, ETS is still in various stages of development globally. With the EU as the 
exception, in many countries ETS is still in the policy stage or passed but not yet officially 
operating. With the end of Kyoto commitment in 2012 fast approaching, it seems that the 
objective to establish an internationally linked ETS to curb emissions will be passed onto the 
post-Kyoto period. 
 The EU is at the forefront in devising an ETS with its multi-country ETS since 2005. 
The weak design of collecting data of initial emissions levels, setting carbon caps and 
grandfathering the emissions allowances are notable areas to be improved in the EU ETS. 
These notable lessons seem to have been incorporated into the Australian ETS proposal, called 
CP RC. While Australia is still developing its law and regulations to put its Australia-wide ETS 
into operation in 2012, the five state-level ETSs appear to be on track to achieving its MRET 
and energy efficiency objectives. 
 China seems to be following a similar pathway to Australia, focusing on renewable 
energy and energy efficiency policies, and planning to run an ETS to further cut its emissions 
levels. China is planning to trial ETS in six provinces in 2013, before commencing its national 
ETS in 2015. Indonesia's climate policies focus on two major emissions contributors, LULUCF 
and energy sectors. Indonesia's climate policies detail viable measures on intergovernmental 
financial transfers and the REDD to address LULUCF, and enforce geothermal use to alleviate 
the heavy reliance on coal to fuel its economy. The proposed carbon price in Indonesia is in 
the form of a carbon tax in the energy sector that is planned to commence from 2014. 
 As developing countries, China and Indonesia do not have mandatory emissions 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, but they have voluntarily put forward such targets. 
Moreover, these countries have shown their commitment to develop climate policies to achieve 
their own set of emissions reduction targets. The evidence from this study implies that 
developing countries are willing to actively participate in decarbonizing their economies, but 
are still reluctant to take on binding commitments to achieve certain emissions reduction 
targets. The dilemma seems to be keeping their economies growing, while minimizing the 
disruptive effects of high economic growth on the environment. To this end, developed and 
developing countries are still debating in terms of who should be responsible for cleaning up 
the polluted atmosphere. The developing countries' pledges and emission-reducing policies 
underline the possibility of bringing the developing and developed world together to tackle 
climate change. 
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